Canadian intelligence agency uncovers foreign funding links to 2019 and 2021 federal elections.

Canada’s spy agencies found out about possible foreign funding involvement in both the 2019 and 2021 federal elections, according to testimony at the foreign interference inquiry on Thursday.

Important classified information presented at the Hogue commission revealed that after the 2021 election, a significant piece of intelligence regarding the distribution of funds was considered so important that it was shared not only within Canada but also with international security allies.

Additionally, intelligence reports highlighted by the commission suggested that there were probably at least two instances where funds totaling $250,000 were transferred by Chinese government officials in Canada, possibly for purposes related to foreign interference.

“The significance of the intelligence was apparent,” the summary reads and it was quickly shared with the Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections Task Force, known as the SITE TF, the defence minister, the RCMP, CSIS (Canadian Security Intelligence Service) and the Five Eyes.

Money was transferred in 2018 and 2019 to individuals labeled as “threat actors” by security agencies, who were identified as attempting to influence seven Liberal party candidates, four Conservative candidates, and 13 political staff members. Although it’s believed that the funds were likely not intended to covertly finance the 11 candidates, the purpose behind the transfer was not disclosed publicly during Thursday’s session of the Hogue commission.

The disclosure that the Communications Security Establishment (CSE) had been monitoring information related to foreign funding came to light in a summary of a classified and closed-door interview with two high-ranking CSE officials, which was presented at the inquiry on Thursday. According to the summary, while the CSE observed instances of foreign interference during the 2019 and 2021 election campaigns, the “most significant piece” of intelligence was gathered shortly after the 2021 election.

Five Eyes

The Five Eyes alliance comprises Canada, the United States, Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom.

According to the summary of an interview, “CSE was unable to confirm whether (the RCMP or CSIS) took any actions in response to the report and whether the distribution of funds described in the intelligence report actually took place.” This statement constitutes the sole mention of the substance of the intelligence.

During his testimony before the commission on Thursday, Dan Rogers, who served as the deputy chief of foreign signals intelligence at CSE during the last two elections, affirmed that he is unaware of the subsequent actions taken by CSIS or the RCMP after the intelligence was shared with them. However, he noted that these agencies did request more information, referred to in CSE terminology as “requesting identities.”

By law, CSE is prohibited from targeting Canadians in its intelligence operations. However, if it acquires the names or information of Canadians while investigating global networks, it must ensure that this information remains undisclosed.

However, other agencies have the authority to request these specific details, and there is a defined process through which they can be disclosed.

Although top officials from CSIS who testified on Thursday were not extensively questioned about the CSE intelligence, they did acknowledge that the report was related to the 2021 election and distinct from the funds being monitored from Chinese officials in 2018 and 2019.

Nevertheless, they declined to discuss any further details about the funding related to China publicly. CSIS director David Vigneault emphasized that the summaries had been carefully composed. He stated, “These words have been carefully chosen to ensure that they are providing you, commissioner, and Canadians, the most accurate possible depiction of what we know while protecting classified information.”

In 2022, Global News initially reported on intelligence concerning foreign funds and political candidates, based on leaked documents. This reporting, along with other instances, ultimately led to the establishment of the ongoing Hogue commission.

Political parties, Members of Parliament, and candidates who have been targeted by foreign interference have expressed to the commission their dissatisfaction with the perceived lack of transparency from security agencies regarding the information they possess, particularly concerning those directly affected.

However, during Thursday’s proceedings, the commission also learned about tensions between CSIS and the SITE task force regarding the sharing of information. Specifically, an incident was highlighted preceding the 2019 campaign involving a “politically-connected Canadian” allegedly acting on behalf of a foreign state.

SITE received this information only after the conclusion of the 2019 campaign and expressed concern over the delayed notification. Initially, CSIS assessed that the individual had already made an “impact” on the election and posed an ongoing threat. However, CSIS later revised its assessment, acknowledging that the individual’s activities had been overstated and that while they could have influenced “democratic processes,” they did not compromise the integrity of the election. Consequently, the report was amended.

This segment of the public inquiry is anticipated to conclude by the middle of next week, with Justice Marie-Josée Hogue’s interim report scheduled for release by May 3rd.